Journal of Accountancy
Volume 35

Issue 4

Article 6

4-1923

Income-tax Department
Stephen G. Rusk

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Rusk, Stephen G. (1923) "Income-tax Department," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 35: Iss. 4, Article 6.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol35/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
Treasury decision 3435 is a model of concise statement. We quote
it in its entirety:
“Where property is sold by a corporation to a shareholder or member,
or by an employer to an employe, for an amount substantially less
than its fair market value, such shareholder or member of the cor
poration or such employe shall include in gross income the difference
between the amount paid for the property and the amount of its fair
market value. In computing the gain or loss from the subsequent
sale of such property its cost shall be deemed to be its fair market
value at the date of acquisition.”
As most individuals make their tax returns upon a cash-receipts-anddisbursements basis this regulation will cause them considerable trouble;
first, in determining the fair market value and, second, in departing from
their accustomed method of making return.
Purchasing property is the initial phase of a transaction entered into
for profit and generally income cannot be realized therefrom until the
property is sold. Inventories are usually made at cost or at cost or
market whichever is lower, and the treasury department has given recog
nition to these methods. It is, therefore, difficult to understand why the
department should expect an individual to inventory or appraise the value
of property on some other basis and return a profit that has not and
may never be realized. This ruling, of course, only affects comparatively
few taxpayers, but it is not in consonance with the broad principles of
the revenue acts and we doubt if it would be sustained were any one to
take it into court for adjudication.
Circuit-judge Rose in the case of Cook v. Tait cites strong argu
ments why non-resident citizens of the United States should not be subject
to federal income tax on income derived from property the situs of
which is in a foreign country, but he also makes strong arguments why
they should be subject to such taxation, and he rules that a tax so
assessed is constitutional. This interesting decision is embodied in
treasury decision 3436, published in this month’s issue of The Journal
of Accountancy. We imagine that many non-resident citizens, whose
income is derived from sources outside of the United States, do not pay
any income tax to our treasury department even though the revenue acts
provide that they should.
Treasury decision 3442 embodies a decision by District-judge
Wolverton of the Oregon district court of the United States in the case
of the United States v. Boss & Peake Automobile Co. This decision
will be found interesting to accountants because of the facts brought out
by the judge in his analysis of the matter at issue, as well as because
of the principles of law involved in it.
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3436—February 8, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1921—Decision of court
Income Tax—Non-resident Citizen—Constitutionality.
An income tax levied upon the income of a citizen of the United States
residing in a foreign country, which income is derived wholly from the

286

Income-tax Department
ownership of real and personal property situated in a foreign country, is
constitutional.
The attached decision of the district court of the United States,
district of Maryland, in the case of George W. Cook v. Galen L. Tait,
United States collector of internal revenue for the third district of
Maryland, is published for the information of the internal-revenue officers
and others concerned.
District Court of the United States, District of Maryland—No. 1293.
George W. Cook, plaintiff, v. Galen L. Tait, collector, defendant.
[January 22, 1923]
Rose, circuit judge: The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States,
who, since 1890, has continuously resided in the republic of Mexico. His
entire income comes from real and personal property, having a permanent
situs in that country. The defendant called upon him to make a return
of his income for taxation. With this demand he complied under protest.
A tax was assessed upon him, and at the time suit was instituted he had
paid the first instalment of it, amounting to $298.34, to recover which this
action is brought, he alleging that the payment was made under duress.
The defendant has demurred to the declaration, and asserts that the
single issue presented is whether a tax imposed by congress on the net
income of a non-resident citizen of the United States, when that income
is entirely derived from sources within a foreign country, is repugnant to
the constitution of the United States. In other lands, the attempt to
impose such a tax has rarely been made. In a report of the British royal
commission on income tax, which forms part of a memorandum on double
taxation, dated January 28, 1921, of the finance section of the provisional
economical and financial committee of the league of nations (official
publications of the league E. F. S. 16-A 16, sec. 3, annex 2, p. 10), there
is to be found the statement:
Double income tax arises when two countries charge income tax
on the same source of income. As it is not ordinarily practicable for
a state to tax income effectively unless either the source of the income
or the owner of the income is within its borders, it may be said
broadly that the possibility of effective taxation exists only when the
source of the income, or the residence of the owner is within the
state. Although the United States of America charge also the income
of a citizen even if he resides abroad, this may be regarded as an
exceptional method of taxation, and the results in revenue depend,
presumably, in a great measure, on sentiment and patriotism.
An examination of the accessible laws of all leading countries con
firms the accuracy of the above-quoted statement, and seems to indicate
that this country is probably the only one which attempts to tax a non
resident citizen upon income he derives from property permanently located
in foreign lands. The supreme court has said:
It may not be doubted * * * speaking in a general sense, that
the taxing power, when exerted, is not usually applied to those even
albeit they are citizens, who have a permanent domicile or residence
outside the country levying the tax. Indeed, we think it must be
conceded that the levy of such a tax is so beyond the normal and
usual exercise of the taxing power as to cause it to be be, when
exerted, of rare occurrence and in the fullest extent exceptional.
This being true, we must approach the statute with the purpose of
ascertaining whether its provisions sanction such rare and exceptional
taxation.—United States v. Goelet (232 U. S. 293).
Shortly after the beginning of the civil war, the demand for revenue
compelled the government to resort to an income tax. Section 49 of the
act of 1861 (12 Stat. 309) limited the imposition to incomes of persons
residing in the United States, or derived, by a resident abroad, from
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property within this country. Section 16 of the act of 1864 (13 Stat. 281)
assumed to tax the income of every person residing in the United States,
and of every citizen of the United States residing abroad, whether that
income was derived from sources within or without the United States,
and the same purpose has been clearly manifested by every subsequent
enactment levying a tax upon incomes, although section 262 of the law
now in force (42 Stat. 232) provides that under certain circumstances
not existing in the case of the plaintiff gross income includes only that
derived from sources within the United States.
Article 3 of regulations No. 62, promulgated by the commissioner of
internal revenue and approved by the secretary of the treasury under
the revenue act of 1921, provides:
Citizens of the United States, except those entitled to the benefits
of section 262 * * * wherever resident, are liable to the tax.
It makes no difference that they may own no assets within the United
States, and may receive no income from sources within the United
States. Every resident alien individual is liable to the tax, even
though his income is wholly from sources outside the United States.
Every non-resident alien individual is liable to the tax on his income
from sources within the United States.
And article 4 of the same regulations declared:
An individual born in the United States, subject to its juris
diction, of either citizen or alien parents, who has long since moved
to a foreign country and established a domicile there, but who has
neither been naturalized in or taken an oath of allegiance to that or
any foreign country, is still a citizen of the United States.
There is really no room for question that congress has sought to tax
the plaintiff’s income, and has used words apt to accomplish that purpose.
Even so, he says it has done a vain thing, for it has no constitutional
power to submit him to that burden. With much force and learning he
argues that the sixteenth amendment did not make taxable anything which
could never before have been taxed. Its purpose and effect was merely
to exempt a tax upon incomes, no matter whence they came, from the
requirement of apportionment among the states.—Evans v. Gore (253
U. S. 260). He asserts that the income here sought to be taxed, arising
as it does from real and tangible personal property, having a permanent
location, is a direct tax.—Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (157
U. S. 429). He then argues that no one has even contended that congress
could levy a direct tax upon property in a foreign land, and it must be
conceded that the idea of doing so does not seem ever to have suggested
itself to any one. He relies upon Loughborough v. Blake (5 Wheat. 317
[18 U. S. 146]), where it was said that the power to impose a direct
tax “extends to all places over which the government extends.” The
assumption throughout the whole discussion in that case was that the
power to tax was coextensive with our territorial boundaries. In his
opinion Marshall held that it reached to them, and, quite obviously, he
assumed that it did not go farther.
The plaintiff contends that one state of our union may not levy a
tax upon real or tangible property having a permanent location in another,
even when the owner is one of its resident citizens. A Kentucky cor
poration owned many freight cars, which it hired out. Most of them
were habitually used in other states. Nevertheless, Kentucky attempted
to tax them all. When the case reached the supreme court, Mr. Justice
Brown speaking for it said:
We know of no case where a legislature has assumed to impose
a tax upon lands within the jurisdiction of another state, much less
where such action has been defended by any court. It is said by this
court in the foreign-held bond case (15 Wall. 300, 319) that no
adjudication should be necessary to establish so obvious a proposition
288
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as that property lying beyond the jurisdiction of a state is not a
subject upon which her taxing power can be legitimately exercised.
The argument against the taxability of land within the jurisdiction
of another state applies with equal cogency to tangible personal
property beyond the jurisdiction.

It was held that the tax was an attempt by the state to take property
without due process of law, in contravention of the fourteenth amend
ment.—Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky (199 U. S. 194). The fifth amend
ment imposes a like limitation upon the powers of congress.
Upon the assumption that an income tax is a direct tax, and is levied
upon property outside the United States, the plaintiff’s reasoning is clear
and simple. It is true that if sound, it carries us farther than is necessary
for a decision of this case, for apparently it would deny the right to tax
so much of the income of a resident as comes from property located in
foreign lands. One adverse criticism upon it is that it is clearly estab
lished that since the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, an income
tax is never a direct tax. The effect of that change in the constitution
was to take a tax upon income derived from sources which had therefore
made it a direct tax out of that category and put it in the class of excises,
duties, and imposts.—Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (240 U. S.
1-19); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. (id. 103-112). Moreover, in the case
so much relied upon by the plaintiff, namely, The Union Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, the question of whether a state may validly tax one of its
residents upon income from sources outside of its jurisdiction, was
expressly reserved, and subsequently was answered in the affirmative.—
Maguire v. Trefry (253 U. S. 12). The case last cited dealt with the
income received and enjoyed by a citizen of the commonwealth from
intangible personal property, the legal title to which was in a non-resident.
—Maguire v. Tax Commissioner (230 Mass. 503). Nevertheless the
plaintiff insists that before the ratification of the sixteenth amendment,
an income tax, as it was clearly not a capitation tax, was either a direct
tax, subject to apportionment among the states, or was an excise, which
must be uniform throughout the United States (Brushaber v. Union
Pacific, supra), and as already pointed out, the amendment does not make
taxable anything which could not have been previously taxed. (Evans v.
Gore, supra). Before its adoption he contends that he has demonstrated
that congress could not lay a direct tax upon property in foreign countries,
and he asserts that it is equally well settled that its authority to impose
duties, imposts, and excises was limited to territories of the United States.
In United States v. Rice (4 Wheat. 246), argued by Wirt and Webster,
and in which Story delivered the opinion of a unanimous court, it was
held that merchandise brought into Castine, while that port was held in
the military power of the British government during the latter part of the
war of 1812, was not liable for duties, although it apparently still existed
intact when at the end of the conflict the Americans resumed possession.
The overwhelming majority of American citizens are also citizens of
some one or other of the states. The logic, not only of the Union Transit
Co. v. Kentucky, supra, but of many other cases as well, and the con
clusion of some of the most eminent text writers, it is argued, negative
the power of a state to tax its non-resident citizens upon income derived
from property not within its borders, and in the case last specifically
referred to, the conclusion was put, in part at least, upon a ground which
negatives the existence of an analogous power in the federal government.
In so contending, it is probable that the existence of certain important
practical differences between the relation of a state and of the United
States respectively to their non-resident citizens has been lost sight of.
One of our American states has little or nothing it can give to one of its
citizens who take up his residence beyond its borders. If he moves to
another one of our states, he practically always changes his citizenship
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at once. There may be rare and exceptional cases in which he does not,
but if so, it is always within his power to do it when he will, and it is
safe to assume that he would do so when the state of his prior allegiance
made an attempt to tax him upon income derived from property located
in that in which he is living. When he goes abroad, and takes his property
with him, as a practical matter, the power of his state to give him anything
in return for his taxes, ceases. He can not call upon it for anything
which he is likely to want and which it can give. It may not maintain
diplomatic relations with the country in which he is living. It has neither
an army nor a navy to give moral or physical protection to him. On the
other hand, he may demand the protection of the United States, and
often does. To a somewhat indefinable extent, he is entitled to it. To be
in the position to afford it, the government must maintain diplomatic and
consular representatives abroad, and keep up land and sea forces. In
easily conceivable cases, the attempt to assert his rights may involve his
country in the expenditure of billions of dollars and hundreds of thou
sands of lives. If he wishes to retain a citizenship which may cost his
native land so dearly, it is not altogether unreasonable to require him to
contribute to its support. For nearly sixty years congress has thought
that he should. Text writers of high authority here and abroad have
assumed that he may be lawfully called upon to do so. Webster on
Citizenship, 163 to 169, and authorities and precedents there cited. More
than half a century ago, Hamilton Fish, then secretary of state, on
December 13, 1870, wrote to Mr. MacVeigh, one of our ministers abroad,
to the effect that “long continuance by a citizen of the United States, in
failure to make income-tax returns would, as a general rule, justify the
refusal of recognition of his claim for protection.”—Foreign Relations of
United States (1871-72, 888). The supreme court itself has said that
it did not in the slightest degree question that there was power to impose
an excise duty upon a foreign-built yacht owned by a citizen, although he
was permanently domiciled abroad. (United States v. Goelet, supra.)
As to the policy of taxing our non-resident citizens upon their foreign
located property minds may differ. It may be said it scarcely comports
with the dignity of the government to impose a tax the collection of
which it has little power to enforce, and that it is not just to tax a citizen
who, because he dwells abroad, ordinarily receives from us little at the
same rate which is levied upon those who are in the daily enjoyment of
all the benefits the government bestows. Weighty as these arguments may
seem to be, they should be addressed to congress and not to the court.
It follows that the demurrer of the defendant to plaintiff’s declara
tion must be sustained.
(T. D. 3442—February 19, 1923)
Income taxes—Revenue acts of 1916 and 1917—Decision of court
1. Constitutionality of Act of October 3, 1917—Retrospective Appli
cation.
The act of October 3, 1917, which is retrospective as of January 1,
1917, is constitutional and its provisions are applicable to a corporation
which was in existence during part of the year 1917 but was dissolved prior
to the passage of the Act. Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (240
U. S. 1, T. D. 2290) cited.
2. Dissolved Corporation—Liability of Stockholders for Taxes Due
Government.
Where, upon the dissolution of a corporation, its assets are distributed
among the stockholders, the latter, under the so-called trust doctrine,
become liable to the creditors of the corporation at least to the extent of
the property received by them. This principle applies to taxes due the
government upon the dissolution of a corporation, although the taxes were
not assessed until after dissolution.
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The attached decision of the United States district court for the
district of Oregon, in the case of United States v. Boss & Peake Auto
mobile Co. et al., dated December 11, 1922, is published for the infor
mation of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.

District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon.
No. L-8786
United States, plaintiff, v. Boss & Peake Automobile Co., a corporation,
C. L. Boss and E. W. A. Peake, defendants.
[December 11, 1922]
Wolverton, district judge: This is a suit in behalf of the federal
government to recover one-half of the income tax assessed against the
defendants Boss and Peake, as the shareholders in equal division of the
Boss & Peake Automobile Co., a dissolved corporation. One-half of the
tax, namely, $6,202.85, has been paid by the defendant Boss and the other
half remains due and unpaid. Boss, while not denying liability, claims
that he has paid his full share of the tax, and that Peake should be
required to pay the amount remaining due. Peake denies liability, on the
ground that he was not a stockholder at the time of dissolution of the
corporation; claiming that prior to dissolution he sold his entire stock
to Boss, and that therefore Boss, being the owner of all the stock, should
respond in payment of the entire tax.
The cause can be disposed of with greater clarity by first ascertain
ing whether, as between Boss and Peake, the latter is liable; and, second,
as between Peake and the government, whether he is liable with Boss
for the payment of the tax.
The Boss & Peake Automobile Co. was organized and incorporated
on November 8, 1916, with a capital stock of $30,000, divided into 300
shares of $100 each. Of these shares Boss subscribed 149, Peake 149,
and W. H. Bietau 2. Subsequently Bietau assigned one of her shares to
R. E. Murphy. Bietau was the secretary of Peake, and Murphy became
the bookkeeper for the corporation. These two were, however, mere
holding stockholders, for giving voice at the meetings of stockholders
and directors; the real ownership being in Boss, 1 share, and Peake, 1
share. In reality Boss and Peake were equal owners of the capital stock,
each owning 150 shares, and each having paid into the concern as capital
investment the full par value of his stock.
The corporation at once entered upon the business for which it was
organized, and so continued to June 1, 1917, when, or shortly thereafter,
its assets were taken over by C. L. Boss Automobile Co. An income tax
of $12,405.30 was levied upon the earnings of the company from January 1
to June 1, 1917; the earnings being appraised at $22,549.94.
On or about May 21, 1917, Boss and Peake had an understanding
between them, by which Peake was to dispose of his interest in the cor
poration to Boss, and the crucial inquiry as between them is, whether the
agreement was for a sale of Peake’s stock to Boss, or for a dissolution
of the corporation and a division of the assets of the concern. Peake
maintains that it was for a sale, pure and simple, and Boss that it was for
a dissolution, with division of the assets. * * *
(The court here discusses the evidence.)
What we have of the books consists in a measure of trial balances.
There was never any inventory of the assets made, and, of course, Peake
never had any knowledge of such, nor any hand or part in it. The process
of dissolution was simply for the C. L. Boss Automobile Co. to take over
the business and assets of the Boss & Peake Automobile Co., in which
Peake, having resigned as director and assigned his stock to Boss, had
no part. The whole proceeding was thenceforward directed by Boss and
McRell. The Boss & Peake Automobile Co., through Boss, its president,
and McRell, its secretary, passed all of its property by bill of sale to the
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C. L. Boss Automobile Co., a copartnership; but the business of the cor
poration was not closed until about the 19th day of June, 1917, nor was
the corporation finally dissolved until the 22nd.
Referring to the affidavits of Boss and McRell, made at the time the
tax was assessed, it will become apparent that Boss then had a somewhat
different theory of the supposed division of the assets between himself and
Peake; the theory being that there was an equal division of the entire
assets of the corporation. McRell concretely states what was then done,
from Boss’s standpoint, as follows:

That on said 1st day of June, 1917, a division of the physical
assets of said Boss & Peake Automobile Co., a corporation, was had
and made by ascertaining from the periodical statement, kept and
maintained by said corporation, of the value of all the physical assets,
including accounts and estimated profits, and by such division E. W. A.
Peake received in cash the full sum of $26,137.15, which was onehalf of the value of said assets, as above set out, together with the
value of a certain desk owned privately by E. W. A. Peake and valued
at $53.50; in other words, E. W. A. Peake received one-half of
$52,167.30, which was $26,083.65, plus $53.50, making $26,137.15.
Boss says, speaking of the alleged agreement of May 21, that the
assets “were to be divided, 50 per cent. going to myself and 50 per cent.
going to Mr. Peake.” His testimony now shows that the total assets of
the corporation were, on June 1, $52,746.64 of which $22,746.64 was carried
in the profit-and-loss account; that $10,000 of this amount was paid to
Peake, $11,373,32 credited to himself, and $1,373.32 passed to surplus
account and subsequently divided between himself and McRell, according
to their several interests in the copartnership. So that there could not
have been a physical division of assets, as asserted by Boss and McRell
in their affidavits addressed to the revenue officers. Nor was there an
equal division of such assets. There was never an inventory made up of
the entire assets, brought down to the date of the culmination of the
transaction, and the parties did not deal with reference thereto when they
closed their negotiations. This change of position by Boss and McRell
is of significance in weighing the testimony pro and con touching the
controversy, and in determining what was the real agreement of the
parties.
The income tax was not assessed against the corporation until May 1,
1920. Peake had no knowledge of it until he received information thereof
from the office of the collector of internal revenue. The tax is referable
in small measure to the act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. 756), but by far
the greater proportion to the act of October 3, 1917 (40 Stat. 300). The
later act, although passed subsequent to the time the business was conducted
by the Boss & Peake Automobile Co., is retroactive in its effect. It is
claimed by Boss that, at the time of the transaction between him and
Peake, the tax was not in their minds, and that therefore it did not enter
as an element in their agreement; that only the current liabilities were
assumed by him. Some of the tax, however, was assessable against the
property; that is, under the act of September 8, 1916. The parties were
presumed to know of this, and, of course, they were required to take
notice of the power of congress to enact a retroactive measure of the
kind denoted by the act of October 3, 1917.
It is a matter of moment, also, that the stock had a value beyond the
mere book value of the assets of the corporation. The enterprise had
proven to be profitable. On an investment of $30,000, the company had
earned more than $22,000 in five months, and the goodwill must have
been of considerable worth. Peake gave up his interest in this when he
parted with his stock.
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Considering all the testimony, and the manner in which the parties
have treated the subject matter of their adjustment, I am impelled to
the conclusion that the agreement consisted in the sale by Peake of his
capital stock in the Boss & Peake Automobile Co. to Boss for the lump
consideration of $25,000; it being understood that Peake should be paid
the salary due him; and compensation for the furniture which was his
individual property; and that it was not for a dissolution of the corpo
ration and a division and distribution of its physical assets between them.
As between Boss and Peake, therefore, the former is liable for the entire
tax, and the latter should not be held accountable for any of it.
Now, as to Peake’s liability to the government, it is not questioned
that the United States may sue, as it has done, for the tax.
The tax provision of the act of October 3, 1917, is retrospective as
of January 1, 1917, but the act is not unconstitutional because of that
provision.—Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (240 U. S. 1).
As is said in Brady v. Anderson (240 Fed. 665, 667) :
The tax is against the citizens and residents of the United States
personally. They are chargeable in respect to income received by
them. The statement that the tax is upon this income does not
create an obligation in rem. It is only a way of saying that the
owner is taxable with reference to the income.
So is a corporation chargeable with the tax, as a person is charged,
although the tax is upon its income.
The government bases its remedy against Peake upon the hypothesis
that he was a stockholder in the Boss & Peake Automobile Co. when and
at the time it was dissolved, and that he came into possession of a portion
of the property in the way of distribution sufficient in value to pay the
remainder of the tax due, and therefore that he is liable. In other words,
it is argued that Boss & Peake received the then existing assets of the
corporation, and that it is immaterial to the government as to what form
the distribution took, so long as the assets of the corporation were actually
depleted by the stockholders, whether Peake received his portion in form
as part of the purchase price of his stock or as a distribution of the
assets.
It must be conceded that where, upon the dissolution of a corporation,
its assets are distributed among the stockholders, the stockholders become
liable to the creditors of the corporation at least to the extent of the
property received by them. This is referable to the so-called trust
doctrine.
As we have seen, Peake sold his stock to Boss. Having the stock,
the Boss & Peake Automobile Co., through Boss, as president, and
McRell, to whom was assigned one share of stock as secretary, by bill
of sale, sold and transferred the entire assets of the corporation to the
C. L. Boss Automobile Co. The sale was in due time ratified by the
stockholders, Boss representing 298 shares of the stock at the time. In
all of this, Peake had no part. Availing themselves of the corporation
assets, Boss and McRell were enabled to, and did, organize the C. L. Boss
Automobile Co., a copartnership, Boss giving to McRell such interest
only as McRell was able to purchase and pay for. The copartnership
having been organized and established as an entity capable of holding
the assets of the corporation transferred to it, Boss and McRell were so
equipped that they thereupon, through the usual formalities, dissolved the
corporation at a time when it possessed no assets for distribution. Again,
in neither the formation of the copartnership nor the dissolution of the
corporation did Peake have a hand. The logical sequence was that Boss
acquired all the assets of the corporation, and utilized them as his capital
in the copartnership, and this by reason of the fact that he had acquired
293
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Peake’s stock. Otherwise, he could not have accomplished his purpose,
simply because Peake would not have allowed it.
Applying the trust doctrine, it would follow that Boss, and not Peake,
would be liable for the debts of the corporation, and with them the tax in
question. Aside from this, it must be borne in mind that Boss assumed
the liabilities, and Peake was to be relieved of them.
In Pierce v United States (255 U. S. 398), the Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
sold and transferred all its property to the Pierce Oil Corporation, and the
proceeds were distributed among three stockholders. Suit was instituted
against the Waters-Pierce Oil Co. and the three stockholders for the
amount of a sentence imposed against the oil company. The bill was dis
missed as against the oil company, and the government was awarded a
decree against the stockholders.
In the case of Martin v. City of Lexington (210 S. W. 483) all the
owners of stock in Curry, Brown & Snyder, a corporation, sold and
delivered to E. L. Martin their share of stock, which transaction he
attempted to construe as a purchase of the assets. After the sale Martin
took charge of the business and commingled his merchandise with that
taken over. He was held liable for taxes assessed against the corpora
tion’s stock of merchandise, in a suit to recover against him as a
stockholder.
These cases are illustrative. Both proceeded under the trust doctrine
for recovery; not otherwise. The Martin case is of marked analogy to
the one at bar. Martin claimed to have purchased the assets, and not
the stock, but the court held otherwise.
It was said that Peake depleted the assets of the corporation, and that
for this he is liable. What he did, so far as the record shows, was to
loan the C. L. Boss Automobile Co. $9,600, and take as security for the
payment thereof mortgages on certain cars, which were previously a part
of the assets of the corporation. The money was advanced to the copart
nership by check, and by it turned over to Boss, who utilized it in paying
Peake in part. The copartnership was left, as we have seen, owing Peake
the amount of the $9,600. The result was that a part of the previous
assets of the corporation, but now the property of the copartnership, was
thus incumbered in favor of Peake. Another circumstance is that Boss
borrowed $8,537.15 from the corporation on his note, and with this paid
Peake, in part, the consideration for which he sold his stock.
Whether this amounted to a depletion of the assets of the corporation
may be questioned, even though the property had not passed to the copart
nership. In the one case, the entity had the money, which was a lien
upon the cars hypothecated; and in the other it had the note of Boss, the
equivalent, supposedly, of the money withdrawn from its coffers. But,
however that may be, a mere depletion of assets, unless accompanied by
fraud with the view of overreaching creditors, does not afford basis for
an equitable action to recover against the party receiving the assets with
drawn. Dividends are paid out every day, which action in itself is a
depletion of assets accumulated; yet no one thinks, when the corporation
has gone into liquidation or insolvency, of suing to recover such dividends.
So in the present case, unless the supposed depletion is referable to the
so-called trust doctrine, which it manifestly is not, the government can
not have remedy on that account. I was impressed at the trial that,
Peake having received money which came from the corporation, sufficient
to cover the tax due, he would be rendered liable thereby; but, from the
foregoing considerations, obviously this can not be the rule.
The government will have a decree against C. L. Boss for the amount
of the tax due, with interest and penalty. The bill of complaint will be
dismissed as to E. W. A. Peake, and the cross bill of Boss & Peake
Automobile Co. and C. L. Boss against Peake will also be dismissed,
with costs to Peake against Boss.
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